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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2310 
___________ 
 
PAMELA MCDEAVITT; LEO L. MCDEAVITT, JR., 
                     Appellants 
 
v. 
 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MCCARTHY; THE HONORABLE JUDITH 
FRIEDMAN; FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT; BENEFICIAL CONSUMER DISCOUNT 
CO, DBA Beneficial Mortgage Co of Pennsylvania; ANDREW K. STUTZMAN; 
MICHELLE H. BADOLATO; IAN LONG; STRADLEY, RONON, STEVENS AND 
YOUNG; KIM HONG; TONY, (Motions Clerk) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-00249) 
District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 26, 2019 
Before:  GREENAWAY, Jr., RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 9, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pamela McDeavitt and Leo L. McDeavitt, Jr., appeal the District Court’s sua 
sponte dismissal of their case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) because the 
complaint was frivolous, failed to state a claim, and sought monetary relief against 
defendants who are immune from such relief.  For the following reasons, we will affirm 
the District Court’s judgment. 
The McDeavitts brought suit against Judge McCarthy, Judge Friedman, and Tony 
(a Motions Clerk); the Fifth Judicial District; Stradley, Ronon, Stevens, and Young (a law 
firm); Andrew Strutzman, Michelle Badolato, Ian Long, and Kim Hong (attorney 
defendants); and Beneficial Mortgage Company of Pennsylvania (Beneficial).  The 
McDeavitts maintained they had been denied due process and equal access to the court 
system in a foreclosure case which was taking place in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Allegheny County.  The McDeavitts alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 
1985(3), the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause, and state-law claims for 
fraud, theft, and conversion. 
After the District Court granted the McDeavitts’ motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis (IFP), the case was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who drafted a Report and 
Recommendation (R&R) advising that the case be dismissed.  The Magistrate Judge 
reasoned that the Fifth Judicial District, Judge McCarthy, Judge Friedman, and Tony the 
Motions Clerk could not be sued due to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.  
Additionally, to the extent these parties were being sued in their individual capacities, 
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judicial immunity acted as a bar to suit against the judges and quasi-judicial immunity 
barred a suit against the Motions Clerk. 
As to the § 1983 claims against the attorney defendants, the law firm, and 
Beneficial, the Magistrate Judge determined that none of these parties were state actors, 
and thus § 1983 was inapplicable.  With regard to § 1985(3), the Magistrate Judge found 
that the McDeavitts had not alleged specific facts that would support a claim for 
conspiracy.  Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims for fraud, theft, and 
conversion.  The District Court adopted the R&R and dismissed the complaint pursuant 
to the IFP screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).  The McDeavitts 
timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is de novo.1  See 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  A District Court may dismiss a 
complaint sua sponte on the immunity grounds of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) when it is clear on 
the face of the complaint that a party is immune from suit.  See Walker v. Thompson, 288 
                                              
1 We understand the District Court’s frivolousness determination to be based on its 
conclusion that the McDeavitts’ claims rested on meritless legal theories, not on fanciful 
factual allegations.  See Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 462 n.18 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting 
“a district court may base its frivolousness determination either on [1] its conclusion that 
a claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or [2] on a finding that the 
complaint’s factual allegations . . . are clearly baseless, and that we suggest deference 
only to the latter” (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted)), partially 
abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759  (2015). 
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F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002).  When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for 
failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the District Court uses the same 
standard it employs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  See Allah, 229 F.3d at 223.  “[A] 
complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Fleisher v. Standard Ins., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 
2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We accept all 
factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe those facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.  Id.  
On appeal, the McDeavitts have failed to make any substantive arguments 
challenging the District Court’s determinations.  Instead, the McDeavitts argue the 
frivolousness standard under § 1915 is “more lenient” than the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, 
and further maintain that “[s]ince the IFP was granted, [that] means the Complaint was 
not considered frivolous[.]”2  Appellants’ Br. 2–3.  The only argument the McDeavitts 
advance to support that they have stated a claim is a single sentence asserting “[t]hey 
alleged facts which must be viewed in the light most favorable to them and they certainly 
plead enough facts to permit their claim to proceed.”  Appellants’ Br. 3.  The McDeavitts 
do not present arguments contesting the R&R’s determination on the applicability of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity or judicial immunity. They do not address the finding 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
2 We note that a District Court’s IFP grant does not mean that the court has also 
determined the underlying complaint is not frivolous; rather, “the general practice in this 
Circuit is to grant leave to proceed [IFP] based solely on a showing of indigence.”  Gibbs 
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that the parties were not state actors for purposes of § 1983, nor do the point to any facts 
supporting a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3).  Finally, they do not mention their state 
law claims. 
Consequently, the McDeavitts have effectively waived any challenge to the 
District Court’s rulings on these matters.3  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-
CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is 
waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing 
reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of Panther Valley Sch. 
Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have consistently refused to consider 
ill-developed arguments or those not properly raised and discussed in the appellate 
briefing.”).   
Even if we declined to enforce this waiver, we would—for the reasons mentioned 
above and thoroughly discussed in the R&R—find no error in the District Court’s 
dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).  In addition, we are satisfied that any 
amendment of the McDeavitts’ complaint would be futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview 
                                                                                                                                                  
v. Ryan, 160 F.3d 160, 161 n.1 (3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). 
3 While we are mindful of the McDeavitts’ pro se status, and although we construe pro se 
filings liberally, this policy has not prevented us from applying the waiver doctrine to pro 
se appeals.  See, e.g., Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam); Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 161 n.10 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002).  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm 
the District Court’s judgment. 
